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9.1 Retirement and Civil War Pension System
During the last century, retirement became an increasingly important as-
pect of the U.S. labor market. The retirement rate increased substantially,
and more Americans began leaving the labor market at earlier ages, chang-
ing the ratio of retirees and workers. These changes coincided with the ad-
vent of the Social Security system and old age and disability beneﬁts pro-
grams, which have grown signiﬁcantly. The extent to which these beneﬁts
aﬀect retirement not only is an interesting issue to analyze, but is also an im-
portant question to ask from the point of view of public policy. The desir-
ability of these programs must be viewed in light of the reduction in the la-
bor force they produced.
Several studies have attempted to empirically measure the change in la-
bor force participation produced by nonlabor income from various pro-
grams. This paper will approach the issue by using Civil War pension data
to identify the eﬀect of pension income on the labor force participation of
veterans. The original researcher in this area is Costa (1993, 1995b, and
1998a), who ﬁnds that a substantially lower participation rate of the Union
Army veterans compared to the U.S. population at large resulted from the
income eﬀect of the federal pension system. In addition, comparisons over
time reveal a declining elasticity of retirement with respect to income. Re-
cently, the Center for Population Economics (CPE) at the University of
Chicago and the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) project
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ulation Economics are gratefully acknowledged.at the University of Minnesota released new data sets that are suitable for
this analysis. The availability of these new, larger, and more comprehensive
data makes it suﬃciently important to reexamine the earlier estimates of the
impact of the Civil War pension on retirement rate among the Union vet-
erans. This paper will also explore several ways to model the Civil War pen-
sion. Instead of using only the average monthly pension income, several
measures of pension income such as the total lifetime amount and the in-
ﬂation-adjusted amount will be employed in the regressions. In addition,
this paper will try to identify the treatment eﬀect of pensions by making a
comparison between the Union and the Confederate veterans.
The Civil War pension program granted a large pension income to Union
veterans. Over the decades that followed the war, there was a large expan-
sion of the program both in its magnitude and scope. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, veterans were no longer required to prove that their disabil-
ity was related to the military service in order to be eligible for a pension.
Old age became the minimal eligibility requirement in the early years of the
twentieth century. By 1910, more than 90 percent of Union Army veterans
were receiving federal pensions. The average pension was $189.08 a year.
This amount represents 74 percent of a farm laborer’s average annual in-
come, 51 percent of a laborer’s average annual income, and 22 percent of a
professional’s average annual income.1 The Report of the Commissioner of
Pensions for 1917 stated that the total amount paid to the pensioners of the
Civil War was over $4.9 billion, which is 70 times larger than the amount
paid to pensioners of the War of the Revolution, 86 times larger than the
War with Spain, 96 times larger than the Mexican War, and 107 times larger
than the War of 1812.
Figure 9.1plots the mean pension income per veteran.2To account for in-
ﬂation, both the nominal value and the real value are plotted. The real value
was computed by compounding or discounting the nominal value by an in-
terest factor.3 The base year in the computation is 1910. The interest factor
for any year is the product of annual interest rate between that year and
1910. In contrast to the nominal pension proﬁle, the real proﬁle is relatively
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1. The average annual income of farm laborers, laborers, and professionals are imputed an-
nual incomes in 1900 calculated by Preston and Haines (1991).
2. The CPE data set records the amount of pension received for each pension application.
For each application, the total pension amount is converted into the annual pension income.
Then the pension proﬁle is constructed by combining amounts in the same year from all ap-
plications together. Missing values in the ending date of the pension ruling are replaced by the
beginning date of the next pension ruling. The ﬂuctuation in the right tail of the plot occurs be-
cause of the small sample size.
3. The nominal interest rate used for the computation is the yield of the American railroads
bond. The yield stops being published in 1937. After 1937, corporate bonds’ yield (Moody’s
Aaa) is used. These numbers are obtained from Series X 476–477 in the U.S. Bureau of Cen-
sus (1975). The computation of the real proﬁle is as follows. Denote nominal pension income
by At, and real interest rate by r t. For any period t after 1910, the real value is At/[Πt
i 1910(1  
r i)]. For any period t before 1910, the value is AtΠi t
1910(1   r i).ﬂat, and is bounded within the range of $150 to $300 per year except for the
years immediately following the war. Humps observed in the left tail of the
discounted real proﬁle are expected because the left tail is composed of vet-
erans who received pensions immediately after the war at young ages. Most
of these veterans could attribute their disabilities to the war, which allowed
them to claim large pension incomes. After the revision of the pension law
in 1890, veterans were not required to trace their health problems to the
war. Hence, the pensioners after 1890 were composed more of veterans who
developed health problems unrelated to their military service. The pension
law provided a smaller amount of pension income to them.
Unlike most social insurance schemes, the federal pension was not a
compensation for a loss of job, nor were the veterans required to stop work-
ing to be eligible for the pension. It did not produce a labor-leisure substi-
tution eﬀect. In general, the amount of the pension was granted based on
rank, age, health conditions, the severity of disability (if any), and whether
the disability was related to military service. The magnitudes of income and
eligibility depend on which pension systems the veterans applied under. The
Civil War pensions can be divided into two systems, the disability pension
and the service pension system. The disability pension system, also known
as the invalid pensions system and the General Law system, was created
during the war. Its establishment was intended to attract voluntary enlist-
ment by providing compensation to veterans who were injured during the
war. Pensions were granted based on rank and the severity of the injury or
disease contracted. According to Glasson,
In passing the act of 1862, Congress founded what has been called in the
Bureau of Pensions the “general law pension system.” This was the only
system of pension laws in force and applying to the Civil War until 1890.
It provides pensions for soldiers who have incurred permanent bodily in-
jury or disability in military service after March 4, 1861. The claimant
must show that his disability was incurred as the direct consequence of
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Fig. 9.1 Average annual pension incomethe performance of his military duty . . . from causes which can be di-
rectly traced to injuries received or disease contracted while in military
service....  F o r  disabilities caused by wounds received or disease con-
tracted while in the service of the United States and in the line of duty, the
act of 1862 granted pensions graded according to rank from thirty dol-
lars to eight dollars per month in cases of total disability....  P r opor-
tionate pensions were to be given in each rank for partial disability....
In all cases invalid-pensions were to continue during the existence of the
disability (1918, 125–26).
In contrast, the service pension system was created in 1890, and was in-
tended to provide pensions to veterans who served the Union Army,
whether or not they were injured during their service: “The Service Pension
System provides pensions based on proof of the fact of military service in
the Civil War for a period of ninety days or more and honorable discharge,
coupled with the existence of a bodily disability not shown to be of service
origin, or with the attainment of a certain age” (Glasson 1918, 125–26).
At the beginning of the service pension system, veterans were granted
pension based on their health conditions alone. Old age was not pension-
able until 1904 when the Roosevelt administration issued an executive order
that allowed old age to be considered a health condition. The order became
a part of the pension law in 1907:
[Order no. 78] provided that in the adjudication of claims under the act of
1890, as amended, “it shall be taken and considered as an evidential fact,
...   that, when a claimant has passed the age of sixty-two years he is dis-
abled one-half in ability to perform manual labor and is entitled to be
rated at six dollars a month; after sixty-ﬁve years at eight dollars a month;
after sixty-eight years at ten dollars a month and after seventy years at
twelve dollars a month. (Glasson 1918, 247)
The service pension system was a controversial plan. Many critics as-
serted that the plan was extraordinary liberal, and was made possible
through the inﬂuence of the Union veterans in politics. On this issue, Glas-
son wrote,
The Disability Pension Act of 1890 . . . was really a service-pension law
subject to a limitation—the existence in applicants of disabilities, re-
gardless of origin . . . pensions were granted to ex-soldiers for incapacity
to perform manual labor in such a degree as to render them unable to
earn a support....   But a man might be in receipt of a comfortable of
handsome income from his services as a skilled worker, salesman, clerk,
lawyer, physician, public oﬃcial, business man, or banker without
thereby being ineligible for a pension. The law inquired only as to the
ability of the applicant to perform crude manual labor, and rated in an ar-
bitrary manner those physical and mental ills which, when of a perma-
nent character, would hamper a man in performing such labor....
234 Tayatat KanjanapipatkulWealth, income, salary, ability to make a good living were ignored. (Glas-
son 1918, 236–37)
Union veterans could apply for pensions under both systems, the Gen-
eral Law system and the 1890 system. If both applications were approved,
the veterans had to choose to receive their pension from only one system.
This feature did not lead to a selection problem among the eligible. Many
veterans switched from the disability pension system to the service pension
system because, under the second system, the disabilities caused by the war
as well as those unrelated to the war were pensionable. Only veterans with
severe disabilities due to the military service, such as loss of sight, arms, or
legs, chose to remain in the ﬁrst system. For these types of veterans, the
question about pension income and their labor force participation is not the
main focus of this study. The analysis that follows will examine the pen-
sioners under the service pension system and the selection problems that
arise from the eligibility requirements of the pension law.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 9.2 discusses the estimation of
the treatment eﬀect by comparing the participation rates of Confederate
and Union veterans. Section 9.3 attempts to identify the eﬀect of pensions
by using the variation in pension income among Union veterans to predict
their participation status. Section 9.4 provides concluding remarks.
9.2 Eligibility Requirements, Selection, and 
Estimation of the Treatment Eﬀect
The parameter of interest in evaluating the eﬀect of pensions on labor
force participation is the eﬀect of the treatment on the treated, which re-
ﬂects the reduction in the probability that a Union veteran would work
compared to the probability he would have worked without receiving pen-
sion. The estimation of this parameter is complicated by the fact that there
are no labor market data on the extent to which Union veterans would have
worked if they were not granted the pensions, since most of them received
the federal pension. Despite this problem, one way to estimate this param-
eter is to approximate the participation rate of the Union veterans not re-
ceiving pension by using the labor force participation of a control group
whose characteristics are similar to those of the Union veterans, but who
did not receive pension. Although it is possible to use the Northern popu-
lation who did not ﬁght in the war as a control group, the eﬀect of war
makes it unlikely that their physical health is comparable to that of the vet-
erans. As a result, the following analysis will use the Confederate veterans
as a control group.
This method will lead to an unbiased estimate of the treatment eﬀect if
pension status is exogenously determined so that the pensioners, Union
Pensions and Labor Force Participation of Civil War Veterans 235veterans, were not selected in such a way that they received a larger or
smaller pension income than the nonpensioners, Confederate veterans.4 It
may appear at ﬁrst that the exogeneity assumption is valid for this analysis
because the pension status is determined by the eligibility requirements of
the pension law, and the pensioners do not have to retire from work to be
eligible. However, the endogeneity problems can still arise if the pension law
was created to beneﬁt Union veterans through eligibility restrictions on
their characteristics, which diﬀer substantially from those of the Confeder-
ates, and by creating pensionable conditions on these characteristics. In this
case, the Union veterans would receive larger pension income than the
Confederates would have received if they were granted pension. As a result,
it is not possible to identify the treatment eﬀect with a regression that in-
cludes as independent variables only individual characteristics that directly
determine retirement because, even after controlling for these individual
characteristics, the correlation between pension income and the unob-
served elements brought about by selection problems is not trivial. In order
to correct this problem, the regression must include variables that deter-
mine eligibility of pension status in order to control for the endogenous se-
lection even if they are not related to the retirement decision.
Consequently, when using Confederate veterans as a control group for
Union veterans who did not receive pensions, factors determining the eligi-
bility requirement need to be quantiﬁed so that the treatment group and the
control group can be compared by individual characteristics directly deter-
mining retirement as well as the eligibility characteristics that entitle the
Union veterans to larger pension than a hypothetical Confederate eligible
for the pension. Neither the disability pension system nor the service pen-
sion system considered occupation, wealth, or other factors that diﬀerenti-
ated the North and the South as pensionable conditions. If the Confeder-
ates were admitted to the federal pension system, the amount of pension
income they would have received would be approximately the same based
on this consideration alone. However, since the federal pensions’ ﬁnancing
depended to a large extent on the greater incentives and greater lobbying
power for a generous pension of the Union veterans, the regression needs to
account for the characteristics of the Union veterans that enhance their
ability to ﬁnance the federal pension system.
The Union veterans were well organized and exerted substantial political
inﬂuence through the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). The GAR was
responsible for the passage of several bills that extended pension beneﬁts
under the disability pension system, and strongly lobbied for the service
pension system. According to Glasson (1918), the service pension system
was ﬁnanced by the maintenance of high import tariﬀs in the Northern
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4. Using the nonveterans in the Northern states as a comparison group will create selection
based on health because only healthy recruits were admitted into the army.economy. Since the Southern economy is very diﬀerent from that of the
North, it is unlikely that the Confederate veterans would be in a position to
raise as much tariﬀrevenue as the Union veterans—especially since there is
far smaller industry in the South—or that they would be capable of lobby-
ing to the same extent the GAR did. This suggests that the characteristics
of the Northern economy, which can also be interpreted as a kind of eligi-
bility requirement because they diﬀerentiate the North and the South, are
correlated with the amount of pension income. As a result, state-level vari-
ables that summarize these economies need to be included in the regression
of the veterans’ labor force participation decisions.
Although various methods have been suggested, in the recent social pro-
gram evaluation literature, for how to implement this regression and iden-
tify the treatment eﬀect, the eﬀectiveness of these estimators, when applied
to historical data and the historical environments that generated them, is
largely unknown. Most historical data available for statistical analysis lack
sophisticated questionnaire designs, have small sample sizes, and contain
limited numbers of variables. Application of many recently developed esti-
mators will not always lead to better estimates of the treatment eﬀect than
the more traditional ones. The following analysis uses the matching method
to control for the selection problem. The underlying assumption is that
when the data are conditioned on economic characteristics of the Northern
and Southern states, the problem will disappear, and the treatment eﬀect
can be recovered.
The analysis that follows is based on two sources of data. The ﬁrst data
set is cross-sectional data from the 1910 census obtained from IPUMS. It
contains a 1 percent random sample of the 1910 census, which is the only
census that asked whether the respondents were Civil War veterans and in
which army the respondents served. The IPUMS data contain 617 Confed-
erate veterans and 1,500 Union veterans. The second source of data is the
life-cycle data of 4,528 Union veterans obtained from the CPE. This data
set contains the variables from the 1910 census as well as the information
from all of the veterans’ federal pension applications, such as the amount of
pension they received each year.5
Table 9.1 provides summary statistics for the two data sets.6 The partici-
pation rate of Union veterans is 55 percent. This is lower than the partici-
pation rate of the entire population in the same cohort, 66 percent, and the
participation rate of Confederate veterans, 71 percent. The mean age is 69.
Confederates had larger families and were more likely to live in farm house-
holds and rural areas. Their literacy rate was approximately 6 percent lower
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5. The IPUMS data can be downloaded from www.ipums.umn.edu. The Union veterans
data can be downloaded from www.cpe.uchicago.edu.
6. Since the IPUMS Confederate and Union samples are drawn from the same source, all
variables can be compared. However, only some variables from the CPE Union sample can be
compared with the IPUMS variables.than that of Union veterans. The proportions of Confederate veterans who
owned a house and of those who owned a house free of mortgage are higher
than the corresponding proportions of Union veterans. Among the work-
ing veterans, more than 70 percent of Confederates were farmers,7while less
than 50 percent of Union veterans were.
The matching procedure could be implemented on the data without mak-
ing functional form assumptions by forming cells and comparing the par-
ticipation rate in each cell. Unfortunately, the data do not allow detailed
conditioning without violating the condition that each cell must contain
both pensioners and nonpensioners. Hence, it is desirable to pursue the
matching exercise through regression analysis as well. Matching by cells
clearly demonstrates the importance of conditioning. The diﬀerence in the
participation rates between the Confederate and the Union veterans is sub-
stantially reduced when the data are conditioned by variables related to
farming. These variables include a dummy indicating whether a veteran
lived in an urban or a rural county, a dummy indicating whether a veteran
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Table 9.1 Summary Statistics for IPUMS Confederate, IPUMS Union, and CPE
Union Samples
IPUMS CPE Union
Variable Confederate Union 1910 1900
Number of observations 617 1,500 4,528 7,023
Participation rate 71% 55% 55% 93%
Age
Mean 69.64 69.38 69.12 59.95
Standard deviation 6.09 5.30 5.33 6.09
Family size
Mean 4.13 3.03
Standard deviation 2.42 1.85
Number of farm schedule
Mean 1.64 1.27
Standard deviation 0.55 0.47
Literacy rate 88% 94% 94% 95%
Farm household 61% 27% 24% 40%
Head of household 79% 77% 84% 93%
Free of mortgage 61% 53% 51% 42%
Own house 70% 68% 64% 64%
Live in urban area 14% 36%
Married 73% 71% 75% 86%
7. Occupational classiﬁcation is based on the 1950 classiﬁcation. In this paper, the classiﬁca-
tion is grouped into the 1950 category into four broad occupations: professionals, clerks, labor-
ers, and farmers. Professionals include professional, technical, and managers and proprietors.
Clerks include clerical and kindred workers, craftsmen, and service workers. Laborers consist
of sales workers, operative workers, and laborers. Farmers include farmers and farm laborers.lived in a farm or nonfarm household,8 and the number of farm schedules9
(which indicates the number of farms the household operates). Table 9.2
shows that, when the veterans are compared by the number of farm sched-
ules, the diﬀerence between the participation rates of Confederate and
Union veterans is reduced substantially. When comparisons are made
based on the urban county and farm household variables, the participation
rate of the Confederate veterans lies between the participation rate of the
IPUMS Union veterans and that of the CPE Union veterans. In addition,
the participation rate of veterans who lived in farm households and rural
counties are consistently higher than for those who lived in nonfarm house-
holds in all three samples.
The higher participation rates of the Confederate veterans in uncondi-
tional comparisons result from the fact that the labor force participation
rate in the North is generally lower.10This pattern, geographically plotted in
ﬁgure 9.2, probably reﬂects the self-employment nature of the agricultural
occupations in the South.11This conﬁrms that, in order to identify the treat-
ment eﬀect, it is necessary to compare (or match) participation rates of the
Confederate and Union veterans by these characteristics because the pen-
sion law selected pensioners whose characteristics were systematically
diﬀerent from those of the general population in term of regional charac-
teristics.
This can be implemented more eﬀectively by imposing a functional form
and estimating the regression equation. Denote the probability that each
person participates in the labor force by P 1 if he is a pensioner, and P 0 if he is
not. Let the value of U be 1 if he is a Union veteran and 0 if he is a Confed-
erate veteran. The treatment eﬀect can be expressed as
E(P 1   P 0X, U   1)   F 1(X)   F 0(X)   E( 1    0X, U   1),
where F denotes a cumulative distribution function of labor force partici-
pation, which can be linear, logistic, or probit; Xstands for individual char-
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8. According to IPUMS, a household is classiﬁed as farm household if it is located on a tract
of three or more acres used for any agricultural operations, regardless of the amount of labor
or produce involved. Alternatively, a household is considered a farm household if it is located
on a tract of fewer than three acres that either yielded above $250 in produce sales in the pre-
vious year, or employed at least one full-time farmer or agricultural laborer.
9. The number of farm schedules indicates how many farm schedules any member of the
household received to be ﬁlled out for the agricultural census. It is a proxy for the number of
farms the household member operated.
10. Most Union veterans were born in the northern states. Their pattern of residence had
not changed much by 1910. The majority of Union veterans from both samples still lived in the
East North Central (ENC), Middle Atlantic (MA), New England (NE), and Paciﬁc (PC). The
regional divisions are the same as census divisions.
11. Comparisons by head of household status, marital status, mortgage status, and home
ownership status are also presented in table 9.1. The participation rate of the Confederate vet-
erans is still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the participation rate of the Union veterans in both
samples. The participation rate of Confederate veterans plotted by age and family size lies uni-
formly above that of Union veterans.acteristics;   is the unobserved elements; and the subscripts indicate the
pensioners. By invoking the matching assumption, the treatment eﬀect can
be estimated in a regression with labor force participation as dependent
variables. The estimation equation is P F 0(X)  UE(P 1– P 0X, U 1)  ε,
and the treatment eﬀect can be computed from F 1(X) – F 0(X). In this anal-
ysis, the linear and logistic models will be estimated. It is important to note
that the treatment eﬀect need not be a constant in these models because it
represents both the shift in the entire participation equation and the inter-
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Table 9.2 Participation Rate in 1910 by Head of Household Status, Marital
Status, Mortgage Status, Home Ownership Status, Farm Household,
and Number of Farm Schedules
IPUMS
Confederate IPUMS Union CPE Union
Participation Participation Participation
Value Rate (%) Rate (%)  2 Rate (%)  2
Head of household status
Head 81 62 57.43* 63 64.13*
Nonhead 33 28 0.87 28 1.51
Marital status
Married 79 60 48.26* 62 49.39*
Widowed 50 42 1.87 42 3.22***
Mortgage status
Mortgage 76 67 2.07 74 0.128
Free 76 56 41.47* 60 33.98
Missing 60 46 9.51* 46 11.774*
Home ownership status
Own 76 59 39.53* 63 29.31*
Rent 64 61 0.38 67 0.35
Missing 7 10 0.20 29 3.71***
Farm household status
Farm 84 80 2.12 89 4.52**
Nonfarm 50 45 1.85 52 0.40
Number of farm schedules
04 94 5 1.71
1+ 85 83 0.75
Urban county status
Urban 54 52 0.07 55 0.04
Rural7 35 6 45.61* 55 65.54*
Notes:The Chi-squared statistic tests whether the participation rate of IPUMS Confederate is
larger than the participation rate of the corresponding CPE veterans.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.action of the shift with independent variables. To simplify the analysis it will
be assumed that, with the exception of the intercept term, the coeﬃcients of
individual characteristics will be the same in both F 1 and F 0. With this as-
sumption, the treatment eﬀect in the linear model is the coeﬃcient of the
dummy variable indicating the Union veterans. For the logistic model, the
treatment eﬀect can be obtained by evaluating the diﬀerence between F 1and
F 0 at its own intercept, and the mean value of the explanatory variables.
The participation rate was regressed on the matching variables and some
demographic variables that inﬂuence labor force participation decisions
but do not aﬀect selection, such as age, marital status, home ownership sta-
tus, and head of household status. The matching variables were chosen to
capture the diﬀerences in characteristics of the Union veterans, which are
due mainly to regional diﬀerences. In the regression, these variables include
a dummy variable indicating that the household received at least one farm
schedule; a dummy for whether they lived in an urban county; a dummy for
whether they were foreign-born; the state unemployment rate; the fraction
of wage earners in their state; and the state’s rank in manufacturing value-
added, total manufacturing value, number of industrial establishments, and
number of industries. Data for state characteristics were obtained from the
1910 census of manufacturing.
Table 9.3reports the estimation results for the entire sample. It is not sur-
prising to ﬁnd that participation declines with age, nor that veterans who
Pensions and Labor Force Participation of Civil War Veterans 241
Fig. 9.2 Participation rate of male population over ten years of age in 1910
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.were heads of household and rented a house, or owned a home not free of
mortgage, have higher participation rates. In both the linear and logistic
models, the matching variables are statistically signiﬁcant except the
dummy for foreign-born. They suggest that the states that were more man-
ufacturing intensive tended to consist of the veterans with lower participa-
tion rates. Veterans who lived in states with a high fraction of wage earners,
a high manufacturing value-added, and a high number of industrial estab-
lishments were less likely to work. The number of farm schedules and the
state unemployment rate also control for the higher participation rate in the
South due to regional factors discussed earlier. The estimate of the treat-
ment eﬀect in the linear model can be read directly from the coeﬃcient of
the dummy variable indicating Union veteran status, which is 5.6 percent
with the standard error of about 0.03. For the logistic model, the estimate
was computed by ﬁnding the diﬀerence of the probability of the participa-
tion of pensioners and nonpensioners evaluating the average value of the
explanatory variables. This estimate is 8 percent.
The table also reports estimation results excluding the dummy variable
for the number of farm schedules. The literature and the regression results
based on Union veterans suggest that farmers who retire move away from
their farms and do not operate any farms. The dummy variable for farm
schedules might be picking up a retirement eﬀect. Without the dummy vari-
able, the treatment eﬀect estimated from the linear model is 11 percent. The
eﬀect from the logistic model is 12 percent. It is interesting to note that the
coeﬃcient of the dummy for urban county became negative and signiﬁcant.
This probably reﬂects the eﬀect of the farm schedule variable that was ex-
cluded.
When the sample was restricted only to the border states, the assumption
that the veterans from both armies were similar is plausible. In this case, the
border states restriction serves as a conditioning tool. The estimation re-
sults for the border states are reported in table 9.4. Age and head of house-
hold status remain signiﬁcant predictors of participation rate. The estimate
of the treatment eﬀect is 6.2 percent from the linear model and 6.7 percent
from the logistic model. The standard error is approximately 0.1.
9.3 Interaction Eﬀects of Pension Income and Retirement
A major issue in the previous section is the endogeneity of pension sta-
tus. The Civil War pension eligibility requirements produced systematic
diﬀerences in the characteristics of the pensioners. Estimations of the treat-
ment eﬀect account for these factors by comparing participation rates con-
ditional on the regional characteristics. Another technique to estimate the
eﬀect of pension is to use the pension income to predict participation sta-
tus among the pensioners. This method is usually implemented by estimat-
ing a discrete choice model on a sample, which is restricted to veterans who
Pensions and Labor Force Participation of Civil War Veterans 243served in the Union Army and were eligible to receive a federal pension.
This approach permits estimations of interaction eﬀects, such as that be-
tween pension income and occupation. In addition, by including only pen-
sioners in the regression, the estimation can use the more comprehensive
data set available from the CPE. The pension eﬀect is usually estimated by
computing the change in the probability of participation between veterans
who received larger amounts of pension and those with lower amounts. De-
note the probability of being in the labor force by Pand the pension income
by I; following the notations from the last section, the eﬀect of pensions on
labor force participation can be written as [∂E(PX, U   1)]/∂I.
It is important to note that this parameter is diﬀerent from the treatment
eﬀect. It reﬂects the interaction between pension status and pension in-
come. The magnitude of the estimate measures the sensitivity of the proba-
bility of retirement of pensioners with respect to their pension income. Fur-
thermore, this estimate applies only to the North. Since the CPE sample is
a representative sample of the Northern white male population, estimation
results based on the Union veterans alone will not suﬀer from selection
problems. In the following discussion, the emphasis will not be on the se-
lection issues that arise when comparing the Northern sample to the South-
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Table 9.4 Coeﬃcient Estimates, Marginal Eﬀects, and Mean of the Matching
Regression in the Border States
Logistic
Variable OLS Estimate Estimate Slope Mean
Intercept of nonpensioner 1.82* 6.84
Intercept of pensioner 6.53*
Dummy if Union veteran –0.06
Age –0.02* –0.10* –0.02 69.56
Dummy if head of household 0.30* 1.35* 0.31 0.80
Dummy if widowed –0.02 –0.13 –0.03 0.23
Dummy if not married 0.16 0.87 0.15 0.04
Dummy if rent house –0.01 –0.11 –0.02 0.25
Dummy if ownership missing –0.12 –0.69 –0.16 0.05




Notes: These regressions are based on the IPUMS sample. The slopes are evaluated at the
mean value of the explanatory variables. In the linear model, the treatment eﬀect is the coeﬃ-
cient of the dummy variable indicating the Union veterans. In the logistic model, the treatment
eﬀect must be computed from the diﬀerence of pensioner and nonpensioner logistic functions,
evaluated at its own intercept value.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.ern sample, but on the estimation results within the CPE Union sample.
The aims are to compare the results with Costa’s (1998a) analysis based on
a smaller sample of the current CPE data, known as the twenty-company
sample, and to estimate other interaction eﬀects from the larger data set.
Economic theory provides a general framework that leads to using vari-
ation in pension income to estimate pension eﬀects by assuming that the
objective of veterans was to maximize their utility, subject to their lifetime
budget constraints. They will choose to retire if their reservation wage is
greater than the market wage. Pension income thus aﬀects retirement deci-
sions by changing the reservation wage. The reservation wage of veterans is
represented by the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labor supply. The decision to retire depends crucially on the determinants
of the marginal rate of substitution, which is the amount of consumption
after retirement. Denoting the market wage rate by w t, the consumption by
ct, the labor supply by lt, and the utility function by U, we can write the
probability of observing a veteran working in period t as


















    w t .12
Taking the ﬁrst-order approximation of the marginal rate of substitution



















    X  bC   ε, 
w t   Z    ,
where Crepresents consumption, Xstands for socioeconomic variables that
aﬀect reservation wage, Z stands for the proxy for wage, and ε and   are
residuals. The probability of working at time t is then
prob(work at t)   prob(ε    Z  X  bC).
Depending on the assumption about εand  , the above probability state-
ment can be estimated by a linear, logistic, or probit regression with the ob-
served retirement decision as the dependent variable and the variables C, X,
and Z as explanatory variables. The level of total consumption after retire-
ment is determined by the veterans’ full income after retirement, which de-
pends upon total pension income and upon accumulated wealth.13To proxy
total income, several measures of pension income, home ownership status,
and mortgage status are used. Proxies for reservation wage are age, health,
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12. This expression can be obtained from the utility maximization problem. The optimality
condition is the equality of the marginal rate of substitution and the ratio of price of con-
sumption to wage rate, ∀t, – (Ult/U ct)   w t (  if lt   0).
13. In symbols, the consumption must satisfy ∑t R
T ct/1   r t   A0   ∑t R
T At/1   it, where the
summation is from the period in which the veterans retired to the period they died, and A0 is
the veterans’ stock of wealth as of retirement.and various socioeconomic characteristics. Proxies for health include body
mass index (BMI), wound rating,14 a dummy for whether the veteran was
discharged from military service with a disability, the number of years the
veteran lived after the census, and a dummy variable indicating whether the
veteran served as a private. Body mass index was constructed by Song
(2000). Both variables were created from the Surgeons’ Certiﬁcates in the
CPE data set. Other proxies for socioeconomic characteristics include mar-
ital status, a dummy for whether the veteran lived in a farm household, a
dummy for whether the veteran was foreign-born, a dummy for whether the
veteran lived in an urban county,15 and the state unemployment rate. The
proxy for wage is occupation, which is divided into four broad categories:
professional, clerk, laborer, and farmer. Retirees were assigned the most re-
cent occupations stated in their pension applications before they retired.
Logistic regressions were estimated for cross-sectional samples from the
1900 CPE and the 1910 CPE Union veterans. The estimation results are re-
ported in table 9.5. The estimates of the coeﬃcients of annual pension in-
come are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Using four alternative mea-
sures of pension income yields the same results. Table 9.6 reports the
marginal eﬀect, elasticity, and average change in participation rate due to
the pension income. The probability of participation in 1910 is lower by
0.00076 for every dollar of average monthly pension income. If veterans
were granted the average monthly pension, which is $188.70, their partici-
pation rate would be lower by 14 percent (  –0.00076   188.70). Applying
the same computation to other measures of pension income results in a re-
duction in participation rates between 6 and 14 percent. The estimated
slope of the probability of retirement in 1910 from the twenty-company
sample is 0.0112, and the average annual pension income is $171.90 (Costa,
1998a). If the veterans were given the average pension, their participation
rate would be reduced by 19 percent ( 0.0112   16.94), which is larger than
the ﬁgures computed above. For 1900, the estimation implies a reduction in
participation rates between 1 and 3 percent.
The estimated elasticity of retirement varies substantially with the mea-
sure of pension income used to calculate it. The elasticity computed from
lifetime pension or nominal measure of pension tends to be larger than that
computed from annual or real measures.16 In 1910, the maximum estimate
(0.51) occurs when the monthly nominal pension income is used, and the
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14. When veterans applied for pension, the federal Pension Board ordered them to take an
examination conducted by a group of surgeons. The surgeons rated the veterans based on their
overall health conditions as well as the speciﬁc conditions. The rating was then submitted to
the Pension Board for approval (Glasson 1918). The wound ratings used in the regression are
based on gunshot wounds or bodily injuries, most of which were due to the war. This variable
is created by Mario Sanchez.
15. A county is deﬁned as urban if it contains one or more cities with more than 25,000 in-
habitants in 1910.
16. Refer to ﬁgure 9.1 and note 3 for the discussion of nominal and real pension income.Table 9.5 Logistic Estimation of Probability of Labor Force Participation with Participation
Status as the Dependent Variable
1910 1900
Marginal Marginal
Variable Estimate EﬀectM ean Estimate Eﬀect Mean
Intercept 7.0011* 8.5126*
Monthly pension income –0.0049* –0.0008 188.6980 –0.0028** –0.0002 166.5970
Dummy if professional 1.9761* 0.3719 0.1050 1.9406* 0.0384 0.1440
Dummy if clerk 2.0876* 0.4148 0.2040 1.5655* 0.0366 0.2010
Dummy if laborer 1.3795* 0.3045 0.2290 1.6471* 0.0397 0.2300
Interaction professional 0.0029** 0.0004 20.1860 0.0018 0.0001 25.0850
Interaction clerk 0.0005 0.0001 38.1940 0.0008** 0.0000 32.8600
Interaction laborer 0.0025* 0.0004 42.8460 0.0004 0.0000 37.3320
Age –0.0889* –0.0138 69.1160 –0.0525* –0.0028 59.9460
Dummy if head of 
household 1.4477* 0.3436 0.8170 0.5707** 0.0240 0.9190
Dummy if not married –0.1950 –0.0484 0.0570 0.2940 0.0087 0.0500
Dummy if widowed –0.1894* –0.0469 0.1900 –0.3653* –0.0141 0.0920
Dummy if rent house 0.4485* 0.1073 0.1610 0.1920* 0.0062 0.2600
Dummy if ownership 
missing –0.7244 –0.1791 0.2000 0.4167** 0.0120 0.1030
Dummy if house 
mortgaged 0.4058* 0.0971 0.1210 0.3746* 0.0113 0.1980
Dummy if nonfarm 
household –3.4545* –0.6757 0.5730 –3.4656* –0.1421 0.5460
Dummy if nonfarm 
missing –2.0043* –0.4510 0.1920 –2.9067* –0.3075 0.0920
Dummy if urban county 0.0992 0.0244 0.3140 –0.2621* –0.0093 0.2650
State unemployment rate –0.1721 –0.0267 0.2010 –5.9103** –0.3150 0.2100
Dummy if foreign-born –0.0896 –0.0221 0.1400 –0.1140 –0.0040 0.1490
Number of years lived 
after census 0.0631* 0.0098 9.6170 0.0257*** 0.0014 15.5150
Dummy if BMI not 
missing –2.8620*** –0.4947 0.8230 –3.8484* –0.0622 0.8330
BMI 0.2108*** 0.0327 19.0220 0.2958* 0.0158 19.2640
BMI2 –0.0040*** –0.0006 450.1540 –0.0058* –0.0003 455.5460
Dummy if discharged 
with disability –0.0623 –0.0154 0.1880 –0.4072** –0.0153 0.1940
Dummy if wound rating 
not missing 0.0202 0.0050 0.1230 0.2013 0.0063 0.1360
Wound rating –0.0587 –0.0091 0.2050 –0.1345 –0.0072 0.2210
Dummy if not private 0.1324 0.0323 0.0940 0.1444 0.0046 0.1070
R2 0.3436 0.0871
Rescaled R2 0.4634 0.2265
Observations 4,540 7,007
Notes: These regressions are based on the CPE sample. Statistical signiﬁcance is based on the robust
standard error. The slope reported here was computed by averaging the individual slope calculated from
the predicted probability of each observation.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.minimum estimate (0.18) occurs when the annual pension received in 1910
is used. The maximum elasticity from the 1900 sample (0.43) occurs when
the monthly average pension is used, while the minimum (0.19) occurs when
the lifetime real pension is used. Each estimate reﬂects a diﬀerent behav-
ioral aspect. The estimate of lifetime pension income reﬂects responses that
include expectation of pension income in the future, while the estimate us-
ing pension income from 1900 or 1910 does not. Consequently, the esti-
mates using lifetime or average measures tend to be larger. This result sug-
gests that veterans reacted more toward the annuity feature of the federal
pension than toward the amount of pension in a particular period. In addi-
tion, the lower estimates from real measures of pension income suggest
that, to a large extent, the veterans simply considered the nominal monetary
value of the pension income when making retirement decision.
Comparisons of the elasticity between 1910 and 1900 do not provide a
clear trend as to whether elasticity is rising or falling. Elasticities computed
from lifetime pension are rising from 1900 to 1910, while those computed
from pension income received around 1910 and 1900 are falling. Neverthe-
less, all computed elasticities are signiﬁcantly larger than zero, which con-
ﬁrms the hypothesis that, in contrast to ﬁndings from recent studies on so-
cial security, the income elasticity of retirement fell after 1910. The 1910
estimate from the twenty-company sample, 0.47, is very close to the current
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Table 9.6 Mean, Marginal Eﬀect, and the Mean Pension Eﬀect
Pension Income Mean Marginal EﬀectM e an Pension Eﬀect
1910 Census
Average monthly pension 188.70 –7.61E-04 –0.1436
Average monthly real pension 223.85 –5.23E-04 –0.1171
Total pension 6,474.65 –1.97E-05 –0.1274
Total real pension 8,122.86 –9.29E-06 –0.0754
Annual pension in 1910 190.21 –2.94E-04 –0.0559
Total pension 1900–10 1,630.38 –3.81E-05 –0.0622
Total real pension 1900–10 1,962.90 –3.14E-05 –0.0616
1900 Census
Average monthly pension 166.60 –1.51E-04 –0.0251
Average monthly real pension 149.75 –1.16E-04 –0.0174
Total pension 5,291.87 –3.78E-06 –0.0200
Total real pension 4,928.50 –2.26E-06 –0.0111
Annual pension in 1900 119.27 –1.31E-04 –0.0157
Total pension 1890–1900 1,133.59 –1.39E-05 –0.0157
Total real pension 1890–1900 1,382.77 –1.12E-05 –0.0155
Notes: This table is based on the CPE sample. The level of signiﬁcance is computed relative to
farmers’ elasticity.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.estimate for the monthly nominal pension income, 0.51, and the lifetime
nominal pension income, 0.45. However, the current 1900 estimate is lower
than the estimate based on the twenty-company sample, 0.73.17
Table 9.7 shows that several of the pension-occupation interactions are
statistically signiﬁcant, although the magnitudes of the interaction eﬀect
vary with the measure of pension income used in the regression. In 1910, the
majority of the estimates indicate that professionals are the most sensitive to
pension income, followed by clerks. Farmers and laborers are the least sen-
sitive. Professionals are also the most sensitive to pension in 1900, followed
by laborers and clerks. The most radical diﬀerence is that the income elas-
ticity of farmers had become almost as sensitive as that of professionals by
1900. Furthermore, the occupation dummies together with the farm dummy
variables indicate that farmers who lived in farm households are the most
likely to participate in the labor market, and farmers who live in nonfarm
households are the least likely. The majority of the latter type of farmers were
retired. This result conﬁrms the ﬁndings in Costa (1995a) and Lee (1999),
who found that liquidating farms was a strategy for ﬁnancing retirement.
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17. The diﬀerence might be related to the sample size. Costa’s 1910 estimate is based on the
twenty-company sample combined with a sample of veterans from Ohio, while her 1900 esti-
mate is based on the twenty-company sample alone.
Table 9.7 Elasticity of Retirement with Respect to Pension Income by Occupation
Noninteracted Farmer Professionals Laborers Clerks
1910 Census
Average monthly pension –0.5123* –0.4382 –0.2928*** –0.2515** –0.5121
Average monthly real pension –0.3894* –0.3381 –0.7183 –0.3912 –0.2891
Total pension –0.4544* –0.4016 –0.5206 –0.2705** –0.3640***
Total real pension –0.2468* –0.2186 –0.3591 –0.1778 –0.0935**
Annual pension in 1910 –0.1826** –0.1622 –0.5197 –0.5139* –0.0795
Total pension 1900–10 –0.2001* –0.1810 –0.4324 –0.3777** –0.2266
Total real pension 1900–10 –0.1982* –0.1794 –0.4202 –0.3644** –0.2221
1900 Census
Average monthly pension –0.4395* –0.4389 –0.1721 –0.3716 –0.3153
Average monthly real pension –0.3014* –0.3033 –0.2380 –0.3923 –0.2057
Total pension –0.3509* –0.3671 –0.5220 –0.3172 –0.2852
Total real pension –0.1925* –0.2001 –0.2395 –0.2121 –0.0962
Annual pension in 1900 –0.2699* –0.2809 –0.2887 –0.1086 –0.2217
Total pension 1890–1900 –0.2707* –0.2856 –0.2702 –0.2205 –0.1744
Total real pension 1890–1900 –0.2661* –0.2811 –0.2645 –0.2304 –0.1680
Notes: This table provides the elasticity from the regression based on the CPE sample. The level of sig-
niﬁcance is computed relative to farmers’ elasticity.
***Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.Most farmers exited the labor force either by transferring their farms to their
children or by selling to outsiders. Ostergen (1981) found that the latter
method was gaining popularity when land values increased between 1885
and 1915. High participation rates among farmers and the reduction in re-
tirement elasticity from 1900 to 1910 may have resulted both from the in-
crease in land values and from the self-employed nature of the occupation.
The regressions also suggest a considerable health eﬀect. In both regres-
sions, the number of years the veterans lived after the census and both the
linear and quadratic BMI are statistically signiﬁcant. The longer the veter-
ans lived after the census, the less likely they were to retire. The estimated
coeﬃcients of BMI suggest that participation rates initially rose as BMI in-
creased, but that after BMI reached 26.35 in 1910 and 25.59 in 1900, par-
ticipation rates fell. Costa (1998a) also found an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between the retirement rate and BMI in the twenty-company
sample. Furthermore, veterans who were discharged from military service
with disabilities were less likely to participate in the labor market. This eﬀect
is statistically signiﬁcant in the 1900 sample. The estimate for wound rating,
which measures the severity of body wounds (mainly due to gunshots) dur-
ing the war, is negative, as expected, but not signiﬁcant. The veterans who
served as nonprivates were more likely to participate in the labor force.
There is no conclusive evidence that diﬀerent cohorts behaved diﬀerently.
In general, participation rates decline with age, but the interaction term be-
tween pension income and age is not statistically signiﬁcant. The 1910 re-
gressions generate positive estimates, while the 1900 regressions generate
negative estimates. Similarly, the interaction term between pension income
and urban/rural status is not signiﬁcant, although urban/rural status by it-
self is signiﬁcant. In 1900, the estimate is negative, suggesting that veterans
living in urban areas are more likely to retire. The estimate is positive but
not signiﬁcant in 1910. This result is consistent with the estimation based
on the twenty-company sample, which produced the same pattern.
Other ﬁndings are as follows. A veteran who was head of household,
rented a house, or had mortgage on an owned house was more likely to par-
ticipate in the labor market. There is no evidence that foreign-born veterans
behaved diﬀerently. Both widowed and single veterans were more likely to
retire. Veterans who had missing values in the own/rent variables and farm
household status were signiﬁcantly less likely to participate. The estimates
also suggest that veterans who rented their homes had a higher probability
of labor force participation. Homeowners were likely to be more wealthy,
allowing them to stay outside the labor market.
9.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the eﬀect of the federal pension system on the
labor force participation of Civil War veterans. The paper has made two
250 Tayatat Kanjanapipatkulmajor points. First of all, pension laws created systematic diﬀerences in
characteristics of pensioners and nonpensioners through eligibility re-
quirements. A substantial portion of the diﬀerence between the participa-
tion rates of Confederate and Union veterans is due to these diﬀerences.
The identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect needs to account for this selection
problem. The ﬁndings based on the matching methods suggest a strong im-
pact of pensions on labor force participation. Second, variations in pension
income among the Union veterans explain the diﬀerences in their partici-
pation rates by as much as 15 percent. The estimated eﬀect depends on the
measure of pension income used in the regression. The elasticity of retire-
ment with respect to pension income also varies between occupations.
It is hoped that this study will encourage further research into long-term
retirement patterns in America. By looking at the historical data, this re-
search demonstrated the importance of military pension and farm liquida-
tion as means to ﬁnance retirement. Although Social Security replaced
these methods and became widely used, the continuous decline in labor
force participation reﬂects a stable and persistent process that underlies the
economics of retirement and remains to be examined further.
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